Remote attestation is increasingly being composed with different protocols to provide endpoint security. TLS is the most widely used among those protocols, and the composition of TLS with remote attestation is known as attested TLS protocol. Such protocols are used in security-critical applications, e.g., they serve as the backbone of an emerging computing paradigm, Confidential Computing (CC). In this demo, we present research with Viacheslav Dubeyko and Jean-Marie Jacquet, where we discovered high-severity relay attacks in various state-of-the-art intra-handshake attestation implementations in production. In particular, these implementations include Meta’s AI for which an extensive security review by Trail of Bits could not discover these attacks. These relay attacks have been acknowledged by the CCC Attestation SIG, IETF, IRTF, and the vendors. A CVE (CVE-2026-33697) with high severity (7.5/10) has been issued. Our study reveals that it may not be possible to achieve strong application-traffic (level 3) binding using intra-handshake attestation alone.